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Abstract- Coalition Warrior Interoperability 
Demonstration 2008 (CWID 08), Interoperability Trial (IT) 
#5.64 “Trusted Enterprise Service Bus” (T-ESB) 
demonstrates a potentially quantum improvement in the 
government procurement model for information systems.  
Joint Interoperability Command (JITC) sponsored the World 
Wide Consortium for the Grid (W2COG) Institute (WI) to 
conduct IT 5.64.  WI studied the requirements of the Multi-
National Information Sharing (MNIS) program to distill the 
following objectives:      
 
• “Flatten” coalition networks   
• Enable data and service “discovery” via semantic 
interoperability  
• Demonstrate rapid, adaptive, evolutionary 
acquisition compliant with the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR) and based on commercial best 
practice.     
 
The general premise is that the government should “buy 
down” as much implementation risk as possible of its basic 
information-processing requirement with true COTS 
capability.  An issue is that government requirements, 
especially military requirements, are typically more stringent 
than commercial requirements.   Security and interoperability 
are especially critical.  True COTS offerings rarely address 
the total government requirement.   Accordingly, the IT 5.64 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
If the government (1) continuously develops and 
furnishes critical raw technology to the industrial base, 
and (2) simply publishes its use cases, objective selection 
criteria, and COTS competitive procurement budget in 
lieu of formal Engineering Development Model (EDM)-
type solicitations;  
 
Then continuing industrial competition will generate 
pure COTS offerings that are ever more aligned with 
government requirements.    
 
To frame IT 5.64, the WI designed a government 
procurement consistent with this hypothesis. The IT 5.64 
prototype capability is designed as a vendor team response 
to that hypothetical procurement.   Hypothetical source 
selection depends on actual demonstration of value added 
in realistic mission simulations.  WI used a combined 
Coalition Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and 
Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) mission thread as 
the basis of the solicitation.    Stated government priorities 
are rapid deployment, demonstrated utility, continuous 
improvement, re-usability within and across program 
boundaries, and Information Assurance (IA).  In this 
solicitation, “IA” refers to two broad objectives.  One 
objective is assured methodology for managing risk with 
respect to the need-to-share vs. the need-to-protect 
information.   The other is assured data strategy for both 
discovering valued information, and preventing 
information overload.    The WI vendor team response was 
a prototype web service stack designed to (1) enhance 
“Information Processing Efficiency” (IPE), and (2) execute 
dynamic need-to-protect vs. need-to-share security policy.  
The prototype has a “Trusted-Enterprise Service Bus” at 
the server end, and a Trusted Command and Control (C2) 
Web Portal (TC2P) on the service consumer end.  The web 
service stack includes: Protection Level 4 (PL4) 
government-furnished security services; Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) sensor services; and Intelligent Agents that 
provide a “Valued Information at the Right Time” (VIRT) 
service.  The VIRT service issues a browser pop up 
message when geospatially enabled software agents detect 
pre-defined critical conditions of interest (CCI).    Analysis 
of collaborative interaction among eight multi-national C2 
watch standers shows an IPE for the T-ESB/TC2P that is at 
least 60%, and as much as two orders of magnitude more, 
efficient than the baseline capability.  Analysis also 
suggests 36-69% value added through “need-to-share” 
services.    The WI team used this analysis to craft a 
notional vendor response to the hypothetical solicitation.  
Vendor claims in the solicitation response are objective 
and supported by runtime demonstration and analysis.  The 
hypothetical bid includes life cycle improvement, 
  
guaranteed software currency, continuing customer 
outreach, streamlined C&A, and objectively defined 
“open” architecture.  The methodology allows government 
to transform its myriad technology demonstration venues 
collectively into a competitive marketplace of such 
capability.   The demonstration venues need not be limited 
to scheduled, formal, large scale events.   Any properly 
configured and certified laboratory can participate.  JITC, 
supported by the W2COG Institute, can assist interested 
participants perform the requisite configuration, and 
develop the necessary FAR-compliant documentation.   
I. BACKGROUND 
 
CWID is an annual event mandated by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) to focus cutting-edge information technology 
on information sharing requirements defined by combatant 
commanders.  CWID addresses collaborative information 
exchange among coalition partners, military services, 
government agencies, first responders and U.S. combatant 
commanders.   Each CWID event showcases myriad 
separately sponsored “interoperability trials” (IT) loosely 
interlinked through mission scenarios.  CWID is one of many 
venues designed to accelerate fielding advanced technology 
to the DoD and Intelligence community.  It, as do all the 
others, suffers from the lack of an efficient technology 
transition process. [1]   
 
Multi-National Information Sharing (MNIS) is a Defense 
Information System Agency (DISA) program.  MNIS 
objectives are to consolidate and sustain current multinational 
information sharing systems; standardize products and 
services solution sets; provide product improvements to meet 
essential required capabilities; provide enhancements to meet 
emerging war fighter requirements.  The CENTCOM 
Regional Intelligence Exchange System (CENTRIX) Cross 
Enclave Requirement (CCER) is a subset of the MNIS 
program.  The CCER mission is to “converge physically 
separated coalition war fighting networks to provide a 
common suite of information services to all Mission Partners 
with controlled access to Command and Control (C2) and 
Intelligence applications on a common network -- based on 




World Wide Consortium for the Grid (W2COG) is a self-
selecting collaborative community of experts from 
government, industry, and academia.   The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense spawned the W2COG with a research 
grant in FY05.  The W2COG mission is to advance 
“netcentricity” by applying the best Internet collaborative and 
business models, and by removing the traditional barriers to 
cross-stovepipe collaboration.    
 
The W2COG Institute (WI) is a legally incorporated not-
for-profit, non-government organization (NGO) chartered to 
manage the activities of the W2COG.  The Joint 
Interoperability Test Command (JITC) has commissioned the 
WI to study government acquisition process in context with 
best industry practice.  In particular, JITC wishes WI to 
propose test and certification models designed to accelerate 
fielding netcentric capability.   
 
At the request of Deputy Director DISA, WI has 
studied the MNIS program mission and requirements.   In 
particular, WI designed and executed CWID 08 IT #5.64 
to address MNIS issues by achieving the following 
objectives:    
 
• “Flatten” coalition networks   
• Enable data and service “discovery” via 
semantic interoperability  
• Demonstrate rapid, adaptive, evolutionary 
acquisition compliant with the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and based on 
commercial best practice.     
 
 “Flatten” means to use the same physical 
infrastructure to support networked private coalition 
enclaves.   “Discovery” means that consumers can 
compose their own versions of “operating pictures” 
dynamically by selecting critical bits of information from 
the huge pool of data available on the network.  Flattening 
networks and enabling discovery requires balancing the 
“need-to-share” and the “need-to-protect” information.     
II. APPROACH 
 
The premise of CWID 08 IT 5.64 is that the government 
should “buy down” as much implementation risk as possible 
of its basic information processing requirement with true 
COTS capability.  That premise infers that the best way to 
harvest up-to-date and viable technology is by simply 
purchasing it as it becomes available on the market.  An issue 
is that government requirements, especially military 
requirements, are typically more stringent than commercial 
requirements.   Security and interoperability are especially 
critical.  True COTS offerings rarely address the total 
government requirement.   Accordingly, the IT 5.64 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
If the government (1) continuously develops and 
furnishes critical raw technology to the industrial 
base, and (2) simply publishes its use cases, objective 
selection criteria, and COTS competitive 
procurement budget in lieu of formal Engineering  
Development  Model (EDM)-type solicitations;  
 
Then continuing industrial competition will generate 
pure COTS offerings that are ever more aligned with 
government requirements.    
  
valued information, and preventing information 
overload.     
 
If this hypothesis tests true, then the tasks of a Program 
Manager (PM) become as follows:  
 
• Deploy the best available COTS architectures 
and products frequently 
• Divest of legacy architectures just as frequently 
• Document the COTS capability vs. total 
requirement gap 
• Invest to develop technology to bridge the gap 
• Iterate continuously 
 
To succeed in these tasks, PMs need an objective 
framework to enforce policy and manage the myriad and 
evolving options around technology, architecture, license 
models, test & certification, contract vehicles, billable hours, 
etc.  The WI team designed CWID IT 5.64 to (1) test the 
central hypothesis, and (2) collect data necessary to design 
such a framework.   They assumed the following:    
 
• Operationally expert customers must play a 
continuing hands-on role throughout 
acquisition lifecycle.   
• Certification authorities such as NSA, 
DOT&E, JITC, DAA, must partner to 
streamline the acquisition process. 
• Efficient technology transfer from 
demonstration to operations is a primary 
objective 
• Cross-program re-use  of capability is a 
primary objective 
• Information Assurance (IA) is a primary 
objective including 
o An assured approach to manage 
risk re: need-to-protect vs. need-
to-share  
o An assured approach to “discover” 
valued information and to prevent 
information overload. 
  
WI designed CWID 08 IT 5.64 to simulate a typical 
vendor response to a solicitation per the hypothesis stated 
above.   Several commercial members of the WI worked 
hard to do that realistically.   
III. HYPOTHETICAL SOLICITATION 
 
The government will (hypothetically) begin to field this 
capability in the first quarter of FYXX.  The Government 
strategy is to deploy best available off-the-shelf (OTS) 
capability and contract with material providers to 
continuously improve their OTS offerings, in context with 
emergent operational requirements, and in close 
partnership with the operational user community.   
Contract awards will depend on actual demonstration of 
value added in realistic mission simulations.  Government 
priorities are demonstrated utility, rapid deployment, 
continuous improvement, re-usability within the network 
enterprise and across program boundaries, and 
Information Assurance (IA).  In this solicitation, “IA” 
refers to two broad objectives.  One is assured 
methodology for managing risk with respect to the need-
to-share vs. the need-to-protect information.   The other is 
assured data strategy for both discovering 
Procurement opportunity: 
  
The government (hypothetically) intends to field MNIS capability with as many generic off-the-shelf 
components as possible.   In that sense the government intends that its MNIS program execution 
funds “seed” a market for universally useful components.    Other government programs are likely to 
consume components that have been (hypothetically) validated and pre-approved for MNIS 
application. 
  
1. $10M  (hypothetically) budgeted for MNIS COTS procurement in 3Q FY(XX-1)  
 
2. Between four and twelve Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts awarded 
(hypothetically), each with $100M/yr ceiling for FYXX-(XX+5).  These IDIQ contracts will be 
reviewed annually.  Renewal depends (hypothetically) on actual performance against source 
selection criteria.  
Assume: 
 
1. Multi-member international Coalition performs MDA and MIO command and control via 
Internet Protocol network.   
 
2. Government furnished equipment  (GFE)* includes the following:  
  
 
Government off the Shelf (GOTS) Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC) web services.    
 
GOTS medium assurance (Protection Level (PL) 4) GOTS authentication (AuthN), i.e. single 
sign on (SSO), web service.   This capability uses GOTS software and open SSO standards 
to allow separation of different levels of access at the same security classification on the 
same physical networks and/or devices.  
 
GOTS medium assurance (PL4 target) GOTS dynamic authorization (AuthZ) web service.   
This capability allows creation and collapsing of coalition enclaves, i.e. different levels of 
access at the same security classification, on the same physical network and/or devices.  
Authorization is based on dynamic policy that considers identity, role, and emergent factors 
on the ground.   
 
Streamlined early adopter net-ready assessment process per DISA Federated Development 
and Certification Environment (FDCE) pilot project. ** 
 
*Available at https://svn.metnet.navy.mil (This site has been enabled support user identification and 
authentication using DoD PKI. For more information on how to get a PKI certificate please visit 
https://infosec.navy.mil/PKI or contact the NAVY PKI Help Desk at 1-800-304-4636/DSN 588-4286 
itac@infosec.navy.mil) 
 
** See https://www.forge.mil   (This site is under construction as of 12-19-08) 
 Task: 
 
The operational scenario includes a geographically distributed multinational Coalition Task Force (CTF).   
A known threat is that adversaries will attempt to smuggle weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into the 
West Coast of the US from the sea.   The CTF Commander’s Intent makes “Maritime Domain 
Awareness” (MDA) to spot potential perpetuators a top priority.  Likewise, Commander’s Intent makes 
“Maritime Interdiction Operations” (MIO) to neutralize perpetuators a top operational priority.  To support 
Commander’s Intent, the government requires an assured information system to accomplish, at 
minimum, the following critical tasks. 
  
1. Establish at least two private information-sharing enclaves on an Internet Protocol 
network with separation assured at Protection Level 4 (PL4)[3].    
 
2. Add value to the following Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)[4]/Maritime 
Interdiction Operations (MIO)[5] threat/mission scenario:  
 
a. Threat CONOP is to pose as a US Merchant vessel by transmitting false 
information on Coast Guard Automated Information System (AIS).   When threat 
vessel reaches three mile limit and is screened by heavy shipping and fishing 
traffic it stops transmitting, changes course for the nearest point of land, and 
increases speed.    Threat CONOP includes attempts to use environment 
conditions such as low visibility, high seas, or degraded electro-magnetic 
propagation, to further mask threat vessel maneuvers.   
 
b. Coalition task is to uncover deception and intercept threat vessel.   
 
Source selection criteria: 
 
In context with the task above, the government will competitively select vendor offerings, and renew 
contracts, based on a numerical score of proposals.  Slide presentations and white papers without 
substantiating objective run-time demonstrations are non-responsive.   Government encourages creative 
  
responses that optimize options associated with architecture, technology, license, test & certification, 
contract vehicles, and billable hours.  The government will consider the value attributes listed below in its 
scoring algorithms.  Some of these attributes may be given greater weight than others.   
 
1. Objective run-time demonstration of: 
a. Enhanced  probability of coalition members detecting a covert maritime threat  
b. Reduced detect- to-engage time for coalition Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)  
c. Assured risk management in balancing  need-to-protect vs. need-to-share information across 
a military coalition 
d. Assured data strategy to prevent information overload in a coalition Command and Control 
(C2) environment 
 
2. Credible “net-ready” assessment timeline including:   
a. PL4 Secret and Below Interoperability (SABI) Certification[6] 
b. (At least) Interim Authority to Operate  (IATO)[7]  
c.  Interoperability certification[8] 
d. NR-KPP assessment[9] 
e. Operational Test [10] 
 
3. Lifecycle maintenance model including: 
a. Continuing currency of IT architecture 
b. Continuing customer connection. 
c. Cost  
d. Cross-program re-usability of IT architecture 
 
IV. PROTOTYPE SPECIFICATION 
 
In keeping with the premise for IT 5.64, vendors respond 
hypothetically to the hypothetical solicitation.   A WI team led 
by QinetQ North American and Raytheon played the role of 
vendors.   This WI team actually consulted with members of 
the MDA Community of Interest[11] to develop the following 
counter-threat mission thread.    
 
1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) sensors monitor 
shipping traffic including AIS transponder signals. 
2. Watch standers compose “User-Defined Operating 
Picture (UDOP)
a
”  for vicinity of threat vector using 
the following geospatially enabled services: 
a. Automated Information System (AIS) ship tracks   
 
b. Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC) 
warnings 
 








d. Map background   
 
e. “Intelligent agents” [12](i.e. software ‘bots.) 
 
3. Intelligent agents monitor UDOP and deliver “pop 
up” message when critical conditions of interest 
occur.   
 
4. Assured web services manage single-sign-on 
authentication and authorization throughout.  
 
5. Senior coalition watch officer establishes 
appropriate need-to-know vs. need-to-share 
procedures and executes coalition MIO to 
neutralize threat vessel. 
 
To enable this mission thread, the WI team built a 
demonstration network based on a prototype service stack on 
a Red Hat LINUX Dell blade as follows:   
 
1. COTS Automated Information System (AIS) ship 
track web service.   Commercial ships report 
location, course, speed, flag, and other 
information via VHF transponder. . 
 
2. Map rendering web service built with COTS open 
source “open GIS” tools.   
 
  
3. GOTS Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC) 
warning overlays for GIS web services.    
 
4. COTS Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) sensor 
web service.  This capability allows an 
occasionally connected UAV sensor suite to 
federate with a C2 network across an open source 
“Tactical Service Bus”.   
 
5. COTS Valued Information at the Right Time 
(VIRT) “smart push”[13] service.  When various 
pre-defined critical conditions of interest (CCI) 
threshold values are exceeded this web service 
delivers a pop-up warning message.    
 
6. Medium assurance (Protection Level (PL) 4) 
GOTS authentication (AuthN), i.e. single sign on 
(SSO), web service.   This capability uses GOTS 
software and COTS open SSO standards to allow 
separation of different levels of access at the same 
security classification on the same physical 
networks and/or devices.  
 
7. Medium assurance (PL4 target) GOTS dynamic 
policy authorization (AuthZ) web service.   This 
capability allows consumers to create or collapse 
coalition enclaves, i.e. different levels of access at 
the same security classification, on the same 
physical network.  Dynamic policy that considers 
attributes related to access control, such as:  
identity, role, and emergent factors on the ground 
determines authorization.    
 
The IT 5.64 prototype architecture brokers service 
transactions across an open source “Trusted” Enterprise Service 
Bus (T-ESB).     The prototype delivers capability to consumers 
via a “Trusted” C2 Web Portal (TC2P).   “Trusted” means that 
T-ESB assures authentication and authorization at PL4.   (See 
Figure: 1) “Assurance” means that the capability of interest, in 
this case security, is predictable.  “Assurance” does not eliminate 
vulnerability, it minimizes and quantifies vulnerability.  “T-
ESB” refers to server-side “back end” activity.  “TC2P” refers to 
the service consumer’s experience.    
 
 
Figure 1: The Trusted ESB brokers information transactions, forcing a Protection Level (PL) 4 authentication and authorization sequence.  The 
authorization depends on a policy provided by the service provider.  When a certain individual, playing a certain role, under certain defined operational 
conditions, points a browser at a URL he either gets access or not. If access is denied the requestor simply receives a standard error message.  
  
 
The T-ESB is agnostic of content.  It simply brokers 
trusted transactions among a federation of service 
requestors and providers who accept the risk associated 
with the trust model.     A military “coalition” is an 
example of such a “federation.”  Here are the crucial 
components of a trusted transaction:  
 
1. Requester’s identity credentials  
2. Requester’s role credentials 
3. Declared “need-to-share” condition  
4. Provider’s authorization policy    
 
These four components are independent.  Credentials 
might be biometric, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), 
Long Distance Access Code (LDAC), Personal 
Identification Number (PIN), user-id and password, IP 
addresses, etc.    Authorization policy defines the 
acceptability of a particular credential format for any 
particular federation.     
 
“Identity” refers to a unique individual.  An individual’s 
attributes include things like nationality, security 
clearance, affiliation, rank, etc.   
 
“Role” refers to a temporary function such as “watch 
stander”, “first responder”, “commander”, etc.     
 
“Declared ‘need-to-share’ posture” refers to emergent 
conditions.  Members of a coalition might agree to some 
pre-arranged set of events that warrant varying 
willingness to share information they consider sensitive.   
For example, they might be more willing to share 
sensitive information during a temporary emergency.   
When pre-defined events occur, an authorized watch 
stander might set an “emergency” condition across the 
coalition.   When events indicate that normal conditions 
have returned, the watch stander re-sets “normal” policy.   
 
“Provider’s authorization policy” refers to a pre-defined 
set of rules set by a service provider.  These rules 
prescribe to whom and under what circumstances to grant 
access.   The detail of any particular provider’s 
authorization policy is opaque to the T-ESB, and 
therefore to the consumer.  The policy can be very 
dynamic and granular.  For example if a Canadian 
military member, serving as a watch officer on a 
particular aircraft, under emergency conditions, may be 
granted access to an Australian web service.   The same or 
different person, serving the same or different role, at the 
same or different location, under the same or different 
condition, might or might not be granted access.   
 
 Authorization policy governs the ability to set “need-to-
share” conditions.   Only authorized individuals serving in 
authorized roles under appropriate need-to-share 
conditions may set need-to-share conditions.  
 
The WI team delivered the prototype as a lightweight 
“breadboard” designed in close consultation with multiple 
potential vendors of “production models”.   Vendors 
agreed that if the government actually issued the 
hypothetical IT 5.64 solicitation they would respond with 
robust, life-cycle supported off-the-shelf bundles.  
V. CWID 08 IT 5.64 SCENARIO 
 
The IT 5.64 server was deployed at a single node, 
namely Hanscom Air Force Base.  The CWID Coalition 
watch standers deployed to various internationally 
distributed sites.   They registered their single-sign-on 
credentials, and consumed “authorized” web services 
transparently via Internet Explorer or Firefox web 
browsers.   Authorization depended on national identity, 
mission role, and emergent situation.  Therefore, the 
operating picture viewed at different Trusted C2 Portal 
nodes varied.    
 
For demonstration purposes, IT 5.64 published 
arbitrary US security policy.  Under this hypothetical 
policy, US AIS ship tracks are SECRET NOFORN.  All 
other AIS ship tracks are SECRET REL.  UAV sensor 
data is SECRET NOFORN.   METOC littoral warnings 
are SECRET NOFORN.   All other METOC warnings are 
SECRET REL.   Accordingly, under “normal” security 
policy all coalition role players are authorized to view all 
SECRET REL data streams.  No coalition role players are 
authorized to view any SECRET NOFORN data streams.   
Under hypothetical US National “emergency” security 
policy, specifically authorized coalition role players may 
view the SECRET NOFORN US AIS tracks and the 
SECRET NOFORN UAV sensor data, but not SECRET 
NOFORN METOC warnings.   Under hypothetical US 
National “self-defense” security policy, specifically 
authorized coalition role players in imminent danger may 








Figure 2: Each nation would set its own granular dynamic policy based on a general set of agreed conditions and the specific operational scenario 
underway.  In this case the US is (hypothetically) willing to share some NOFORN data with non-US coalition members under “emergency” conditions 
and even more under “self-defense” conditions. Which specific data to be released to which specific nation and which specific role player depends on 
tactical scenario.   
 
WI programmed the intelligent agents with pre-defined 
critical conditions of interest and threshold values.  As the 
CWID scenario unfolded, these geospatially-enabled 
agents monitored AIS tracks, METOC warnings, and 
UAV sensor data “looking for” suspicious activity.   
Accordingly, when an AIS track approached the 3 mile 
limit of the US West Coast, stopped squawking as a US 
merchant, changed course, and increased speed, the VIRT 
service delivered a pop up message to appropriate CWID 
watch officer’s browser.   
 
In response to this notification of an “emergency” 
situation, the watch officer immediately used a “point and 
click” menu to set “emergency” security policy.  (See 
Figure: 3.)  The tactical situation demanded that non-US 
coalition platforms interdict the threat.  That situation 
constitutes a pre-defined “need-share” tactically 
significant NOFORN track and sensor data.   In response, 
a US national watch stander used a point and click menu 
to authorize those specific non-US platforms emergency-
level access to the C2 Portal.
b









Figure 3: A watch stander with appropriate single sign on credentials can access this “sysadmin” point and click policy menu.  The detail of national 
policy associated with each pre-agreed “need-to-share” condition is opaque to this watch stander.    
 In the course of the interdiction the intelligent agents 
“noticed” that a coalition interdiction platform was in 
imminent danger of entering a mine field depicted on a 
SECRET NOFORN METOC warning.   Accordingly the 
VIRT service delivered a pop-up message.  The alert 
message triggered a coalition watch officer to set “self 
defense” conditions.  It also triggered a US national watch 
stander to authorize the endangered vessel to have “self-
defense” level of access to the TC2P.   
 
When the Interdiction vessel avoided the hazard and 
intercepted the threat vessel, the coalition watch officer 
re-set “normal” security policy.   
VI. ANALYSIS  
 
A. The Concept of “Information Processing Efficiency” 
 
The WI team designed the Trusted Command and Control 
(C2) Portal as a collaborative “service.”
c
   By definition, a 
“service” must provide value as perceived by the 
consumer.  To “information workers”, human processing 
time is a valuable commodity.  It should be spent wisely.  
Military information workers, e.g. C2 watch standers, 
tend to be very busy managing multiple information 
sources.  Their specialized jobs require them to spend 
most of their own human processing time independently.  
Collaboration is “expensive” because it spends multiple 
individuals’ processing time on the same collective task.  
Collaboration is only valued if it achieves important 
objectives not obtainable individually.    More bluntly 
stated, effective communication minimizes confusion and 
accelerates speed-to-decision. Accordingly, a “budget” 
established for managing collaborative processing would 








budget would limit time spent on “overhead” like 
establishing “situational awareness.”  
 
The WI team used this time budgeting principle to design 
the TC2P.   There were two design objectives: (1) 
minimize over-all processing time required for 
collaboration; (2) maximize time spent processing 
actionable bits relative to time spent processing other bits.    
This approach is consistent with traditional military C2 
Radio-Telephone “circuit discipline.”  Circuit discipline 
does not permit distracting idle chat; it conserves 
bandwidth for priority traffic; it insists on unambiguous, 
concise, standard language.   
 
The objective of a budget is to achieve efficient resource 
allocation.   Conceptually, for example, one might define 
“Information Processing Efficiency” as “Utility of 
Information Consumed” divided by “Total Bits 
Processed”.  An issue is how to define “utility” 
objectively.  Different consumers will have different 
perceptions of utility.  However, it is possible for subject 
matter experts (SME) to evaluate the value of some data 
types over others.  One approach SMEs can use is to 
identify critical conditions of interest (CCI) associated 
with plans of action.  Plans depend on assumed threshold 
values of CCI.  When thresholds are exceeded, action is 
warranted.   This is the approach many stock traders use.   
With stock trading, having the stock value information 
even one or two seconds in advance of others can be 
worth millions of dollars.  These traders subscribe to 
various services that inform them when threshold values 
of CCI associated with their portfolios are exceeded.   
That is the time they buy or sell.  In this example traders 
can literally determine the dollar “value” of specific 
timely information.  In military domains the value metric 
may be more abstract, but the relatively greater value of 
actionable information remains clear.     
 
The SMEs for this demonstration were the CWID role 
players.  The role players were fully tasked to manage 
multiple disparate and overlapping events.  Accordingly, 
they considered “relevant” information useful if it 
provided new situational awareness.  However, they 
considered “actionable” information at least twice as 
useful.  They considered “irrelevant” information useless 
because it distracted them from their critical functions.   
The role players defined “useful relevant information” as 
“new information pertaining to mission elements at times 
and places important to mission execution.”    They 
defined “actionable information” as “information that 
forces unplanned action.”   Role players considered all 
other information to be irrelevant.   
 
Following this reasoning, we define “Total Bits 
Processed” as the sum of the Irrelevant Bits (IB), 
Relevant non-actionable Bits (RB), and Actionable Bits 
(AB) processed.   We also introduce the notion of 
arbitrary information “Utility Unit” (uu) to quantify the 
relative usefulness of messages.  Per the subjective 
preference of the SMEs, we assign a value of 1uu to 
relevant useful messages, 2uu to actionable messages, and 
0uu to irrelevant messages.    We consider a bit of 
information added to browser view of an operating picture 
in terms of an overlay, pop-up, or track to be a “message”.   
 
We hypothesize that TC2P will increase the overall 
processing efficiency of the CWID information system.  
The analytical approach is to count the messages 
processed during IT 5.64, and bin them according to 
relative utility.  We can then calculate Information 
Processing Efficiency, at least notionally, using the 
following formula: 
 









(AB))÷ (IB+ RB+ AB)
 
IPE= Information Processing Efficiency 
w = weighting factor, wIB = 0 uu, wRB=1 uu, wAB=2 uu   
IB = Irrelevant Bits Processed 
RB = Useful Relevant non-actionable Bits Processed 
AB=Actionable Bits Processed 
 
B. Calculating the Information Processing Efficiency of 
the Trusted C2 Portal 
 
IT 5.64 scenario participants were as follows: 
 
2 X Coalition command centers 
3 X US command centers 
1 X CA Aircraft  
1 X NZ Ship 
1 X NZ Aircraft 
 
Uniformed military members played roles as coalition 
watch standers at each of these locations.   These role 
players were involved in multiple independent or loosely 
coupled Interoperability Trials.    They executed the IT 
5.64 mission thread, with some variation, over a period of 
approximately two hour each eight hour day for nine 
days.  The IT 5.64 mission thread called for collaborative 
activity, i.e. viewing the TC2P operating picture 
concurrently, three times.   That collaborative activity 
required a total of about ten minutes.   During each 
iteration of IT 5.64, the role players successfully detected 
and responded to the threat.    The generic IT 5.64 mission 
thread, broken down message by message, is as follows:  
  
 
1. Senior Coalition Operations Watch Officer tasks all participants to view the C2 Trusted Portal for 
situational awareness.   
 
a. Watch standers across the federation view eight messages (See Figure: 4) 
b. Eight messages are relevant; i.e. all information is new, presented in mission context, and 
pertains to the area and time of interest.  
 
c. Zero messages are actionable, i.e. information provides useful situational awareness only. 
 
 
Figure 4: Information is presented as web service messages.  Under “normal” conditions this is typical of a message viewed by non-
US coalition members.    It consists of blue ship icons and METOC warning overlays presented on a open source map rendering 
tool. Clicking on icons opens windows with more information. Layers of data click on and off.  NOFORN Littoral METOC data, US 
Ship Tracks, and UAV sensor data are withheld.  
  
2 Senior watch officer receives VIRT (Valuable Information at the Right Time) alert message that CCI 
thresholds are exceeded.  NOFORN UAV sensor data and NOFORN ship track data trip VIRT alert 
message.  
 
a. One watch stander views one message. 
b. One message is relevant 
c. One message is actionable, i.e. CCI exceed threshold value and force unplanned response.  
  
3. VIRT Alert service message causes senior watch officer to order an interdiction.  Mission requires CA 
and NZ assets.  Security services allow senior watch officer to change policy to give CA & NZ assets 
  
access to actionable NOFORN data.  Senior watch officers tasks participants to view C2 Trusted 
Portal and issues tasking to CA and NZ assets.    
 
a. Eight participating watch standers each view a message.  
b. Six messages are relevant.  Two messages viewed by the coalition command centers without 
the NOFORN sensor and ship track data are irrelevant.  They provide no new situational 
awareness.  
c. Six messages are actionable, i.e. six messages viewed by 3 US, 1CA, and 2NZ participants 
display CCI and exceeded threshold values in mission context.  The message forces and 
enables unplanned action.  Without the VIRT service and security services these actionable 
messages would not have been processed.   
 
4. VIRT Alert service informs senior watch officer that NZ ship is in danger of entering minefield.  
Minefield warning is SECRET NOFORN.   
 
a. One watch stander views one message. 
b. One message is relevant 




Figure 5: The VIRT service informs the authorized watch stander that a US Merchant ship hit the three mile limit, stopped squawking, and 
tuned inland. He sees that the SS Black Pearl icon has changed from a ship to a skull and cross bones courtesy of NOFORN UAV 
sensor services.  The NZ interdiction vessel is going to run into one of the SECRET NOFORN mine fields depicted with red icons.  This 
situation calls for “self defense” need-to-share conditions.  At the click of a mouse, and the refresh of a browser, the NZ ship views the 
danger.    
  
5.  Security policy allows senior watch officer to grant NZ ship access to NOFORN METOC warnings. Tasks 
participants to view C2 Trusted Portal.  Issues tasking to NZ ship.  
a. Watch standers across the federation view eight messages. (See Figure: 5).   
b. The four messages viewed by the US participants and the NZ ship are relevant.  The four messages 
viewed by participants without authorization to see NOFORN METOC warnings are irrelevant – they 
provide no new situational awareness.   
c. Four messages are actionable, i.e. four messages viewed by US and NZ ship provide CCI and 
exceeded thresholds in context that enables required unplanned action.   Without VIRT service and 
security services these actionable messages would not have been processed.  
 
Watch standers participating in IT 5.64 viewed a total of 34 web services messages each day.  The TC2P 
message utility breaks out as 6 irrelevant, 16 relevant but not actionable, and 12 actionable messages.  The 








(AB))÷ (IB+ RB+ AB)
IPE
TC 2P = (0uu(6)+1uu(16)+ 2uu(12))÷ ((6)+ (16)+ (12)) = 1.18uu  
What if the SMEs decide to consider actionable information that allows them to intercept WMD to be ten times 
more useful than situational awareness information?  In that case, wAB = 10 uu and the notional IPE for the IT 
5.64 sequence calculates to 4.00uu.   
 
C. Value Added by “Need-To-Share” Services 
 
Consider steps three and five above.  Note that without 
the TC2P security services -- or in this context, “need-to-
share” services -- the messages viewed by the CA and 
NZ assets would not include the actionable NOFORN 
information.  In other words, the sensor service would 
have provided critical information to US watch standers.  
The VIRT service would have alerted a US watch stander.  
However without a “need-to-share” service, the utility of 
the NOFORN information is diminished.  In that case, 
four messages that were actionable with NOFORN 
information become irrelevant without it.  The six 
messages viewed by US watch standers with the 
NOFORN data remain relevant, but are no longer 
actionable.  The message utility breakout for this 
sequence becomes 10 irrelevant, 22 relevant but not 
actionable and 2 actionable messages. The IPE for that 
case is calculated below.   
 
 
   
IPE = (wIB(IB)+ wRB(RB)+ wAB(AB))÷ (IB+ RB+ AB)




The IPE without security services is 36% less efficient than IPE of the full TC2P service suite. If SMEs decide that 
information that allows intercept of WMD is ten times more useful than other relevant information, IPE for 
this case becomes 1.24uu – compared to 4.00uu is 69% 
less efficient than with need-to-share services 







D. Calculating Information Baseline Processing 
Efficiency 
 
To provide a baseline comparison, we assume that basic 
CWID capability, without the TC2P, includes an AIS ship 
track “picture”.  For this baseline case, we assume that the 
role players simply view the AIS picture three times – the 
same number of viewing as in the IT 5.64 scenario. This 
assumption is reasonable compared to typical coalition C2 
Concepts of Operations (CONOPS).   The message-by-




1. Senior coalition watch officer tasks all participants to view C2TP for situational awareness.   
a. Watch standers across the federation view eight messages 
b. Eight messages are relevant; i.e. all information is new, presented in mission context, and 
pertains to the area and time of interest.   
c. Zero messages are actionable, i.e. information provides useful situational awareness only.  
  
2. Senior watch officer tasks all participants to view C2TP for situational awareness.   The threat vessel has 
stopped “squawking” and has disappeared from the cluttered picture.  Even if a busy watch stander notices, 
there is no means to locate the missing merchant vessel.     
a.  Watch standers across the federation view eight messages  
b. Three messages are relevant.  The messages viewed at US sites no longer include an icon 
representing the threat vessel – an indicator, if they notice, of a potential threat.  Five messages 
are irrelevant. Without NOFORN ship tracks they do not provide new information.  
c. Zero messages are actionable.   
 
3. Senior watch officer tasks all participants to view C2TP for situational awareness.   By now, if the threat 
has not been detected and intercepted by other means it is too late. 
a. Watch standers across the federation view eight messages  
b. Eight messages are irrelevant.   
c. Zero messages are actionable.   
 
In this baseline scenario watch standers viewed a total of 24 messages.  13 are irrelevant, 11 are relevant, 
and 0 are actionable.  The IPE for this baseline case as calculated below is 0.46uu, which is 61% less 









(AB))÷ (IB+ RB+ AB)
IPE
Baseline
= (0uu(13)+1uu(11)+ 2uu(0))÷ ((13)+ (11)+ (0)) = 0.46uu
 
A typical coalition C2 CONOP, without the benefit of 
automated software monitoring services, calls for human 
watch standers to view the operating picture frequently.   
In the baseline scenario above, if watch standers viewed 
the operating picture just once every 30 minutes, i.e. four 
times instead of three, the calculated IPE would be 
0.34uu.  Each time the eight busy watch standers view a 
low value message, the IPE decreases geometrically.  
Granted, some C2 “searches” would likely return relevant 
or even actionable information.  However, each time the 
VIRT service “delivers” a message guaranteed to be 
useful, and the security services guarantee it can be shared 
usefully, the IPE increases exponentially.   By this 
reasoning it is clear that TC2P services increase the 
  
assurance that information processed by busy humans 
will be useful.   This finding in no way implies that C2 
watch standers should not “search” for information.  
Rather, it implies that smart push services -- designed to 
inform of known critical information elements -- can free 
up human processing time and provide insight for more 
intelligent searches.    Consumers informed by these 
intelligent searches, may then add to or revise alert 










VII. RESPONSE TO THE HYPOTHETICAL 
SOLICITATION 
 
Although the IT 5.64 analysis is notional, the approach is 
viable
14
.  It demonstrates that the “value” of information, 
and the value of sharing information, can be credibly 
quantified through analysis of critical information 
transactions.   This mission level model approach can be 
modeled in digital formats [15].  SMEs can validate  any 
particular architecture in run-time mission simulations 
using network performance test tools.  The realistic 
objective outcome are suitable for comparing relative 
merits of competing architectures.  A notional description 
of such an outcome is described below in context with the 
hypothetical MNIS solicitation.  
 
 
“….. In context with the task above, the government will select vendor offerings, and renew contracts, 
competitively based on a numerical score of proposals.  The government will consider slide presentations and 
white papers without substantiating objective run-time demonstrations as non-responsive.   Government 
encourages creative responses that optimize options associated with architecture, technology, license, test & 
certification, contract vehicles, and billable hours.  The government will consider the value attributes listed 
below in its scoring algorithms.  Some of these attributes may be weighted more highly than others. “  
 
 
1. Objective run-time demonstration of: 
 
a. Enhanced  probability of coalition members detecting a covert maritime threat  
 
In the IT 5.64 mission model and simulation
d
  TC2P sensors services identified and “tagged” 100% of AIS 
tracks identified as US Merchant vessel that stop transmitting.  VIRT services correlated 100% of tagged 
tracks against threat profile.  M&S results showed 0 false alarms and 100% actual threats detected upon 
entering interdiction window.      
 
b. Reduced detect- to-engage time for coalition Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)  
 
In the IT 5.64 M&S, non-US assets were required to engage threat.  TC2P need-to-share services allowed 
real-time transmission of essential NOFORN targeting data.  The current process requires a minimum of sixty 
minutes processing time before releasing sanitized or re-classified information.    
 
c. Assured risk management in balancing  need-to-protect vs. need-to-share information across 
a military coalition 
 
Government furnished authentication and authorization services, together with dynamic and granular security 
policy, provide mechanism for balancing need-to-protect vs. need-to-share.  Capability is assured at 









d. Assured data strategy to prevent information overload in a coalition Command and Control 
environment 
 
IT 5.64 M&S analysis shows that T-ESB/TC2P provides at least 60%, and as much as two orders of 
magnitude, greater Information Processing Efficiency as compared to the baseline capability.  That analysis 
proves how VIRT services guarantee increased IPE and frees processing time to allow for better informed 
searches for information.     
 
2. Credible “net-ready” assessment timeline including:   
 
a. PL4 Secret and Below Interoperability (SABI) Certification 
b. (At least) Interim Authority to Operate  (IATO)  
 
The WI team is working with NSA and an operational activity, Fleet Numerical METOC Center (FNMOC), and 
its Designated Approval Authority (DAA) to deploy the T-ESB (at SABI PL4) in FNMOC’s accredited 
environment under an existing ATO.  The team is developing components of the T-ESB in context with the 
“Multiple Independent Levels of Security” (MILS) architecture and the Defense Information Assurance C&A 
Process (DIACAP) methodology[16].   An objective is to streamline the C&A process through, re-useable 
“type-certified” medium and high assurance web service component.    This partnership delivered a PL4 SABI 
certification for an authentication component of the T-ESB  in eighteen months.  Thirty-six months is more 
typical.   Target is C&A and updated ATO complete by 3
rd
Q FY09.   MNIS DAA can leverage this on-going 
investment to accredit T-ESB in his/her chosen environment(s).    
 
c.  Interoperability certification 
d. NR-KPP assessment 
e. Operational Test  
 
The WI team has engaged with JITC and DISA regarding items 2.c. - 2 .e.  The WI team is performing as an 
early adopter in the Federated Development and Certification Environment Pilot (FDCE) project.  That project 
aims to perform “net-ready assessment” in parallel with development.   CWID 08 IT 5.64 was designed 
specifically to enable the FDCE concept.  The Target to place T-ESB/TC2P on approved DISA approved 
products list by 4
th
 Q F09.      
 
3. Lifecycle maintenance model including: 
 
a. Continuing currency of IT architecture 
 
 
WI team bid includes quarterly software upgrades and a guarantee to install all applicable new standards 
within three months of their release.   Using the methodology demonstrated in CWID 08 IT 5.64, the WI team 
will continuously evaluate new technology in context with government requirements.  WI will propose 
timelines for intercepting new vectors and divesting legacy architecture -- and associated cost benefit analysis 
-- for government consideration. 
     
b. Continuing customer connection. 
 
WI team bid includes a continuing customer outreach program, i.e., one three day visit per month to a site 
designated by the government.   Visits will inform customers of detailed functionality and collect potential new 
use cases.  WI team will also recruit and nurture a distributed “beta community” among the government 
customers.   Input from the outreach and beta efforts will inform quarterly the software update cycle.   WI 
team will maintain a 24 X 7 trouble desk and provide on-site technicians to resolve any trouble tickets still 
open after 72 hours.   
 
c. Cost  
 
  
WI team (hypothetically) bids $10M/yr, renewable annually, to manage T-ESB/TC2P as a network service 
suite.  Bid includes unlimited software licenses, all server-side hardware, and lifecycle support required to 
deliver capability described herein.  Bid includes processing data flows from all discoverable sensor web 
services.   Bid does not include delivery or maintenance of UAV or other sensor platforms.  
 
Alternatively, WI team will negotiate professional services contract required to install and maintain this 
network service suite at designated government sites.    
 
Alternatively, WI team will negotiate pricing for COTS T-ESB/TC2P appliance (pre-loaded server blades and 
shrink-wrapped client-side software) including lifecycle support as described here-in.     
 
d. Cross-program re-usability of IT architecture 
 
WI team will maintain all information technology delivered under this procurement as purely generic “off-the-
shelf” commercial standard catalog offerings.    WI will offer all capability under unlimited enterprise software 
licenses.  WI team will maintain all furnished GOTS components, and any software developed at government 
expense, under Open Source Software (OSS) General Purpose License (GPL).  WI team will honor any 




The mock off-the-shelf procurement represented by 
CWID 08 IT 5.64 need not have been mock.  Further, the 
procurement need not have been limited to IT 5.64.  If the 
government had chosen to actually solicit vendor 
proposals against real procurement opportunities, CWID 
08 could have delivered any number of real, pre-
approved, supportable, off-the-shelf network capability 
upgrades.   The methodology demonstrated by JITC in IT 
5.64 literally allows government to transform its myriad 
technology demonstration venues collectively into a 
competitive market place of such capability.   The 
demonstration venues need not be limited to scheduled, 
formal, large scale events.   Any properly configured and 
certified laboratory can participate.  JITC, supported by 
the W2COG Institute, can assist interested participants 
perform the requisite configuration, and develop the 
necessary FAR-compliant documentation.   
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